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Peer-reviewedCC BYTheoretical Economics Letters

Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

  • Ludovic Julien
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Abstract

In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@article{julien2026stackelbergcournot,
  title = {{Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy}},
  author = {Ludovic Julien},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics Letters},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.4236/tel.2012.23056},
  url = {https://hal.science/hal-05758733v1},
  note = {CC BY},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy
AU  - Ludovic Julien
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/22
JO  - Theoretical Economics Letters
DO  - 10.4236/tel.2012.23056
UR  - https://hal.science/hal-05758733v1
AB  - In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.
SN  - 2162-2086
SN  - 2162-2086
ER  -