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Peer-reviewedCC BYTheoretical Economics Letters

Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison

  • Ludovic Julien
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Abstract

In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers’ best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@article{julien2026stackelbergwalras,
  title = {{Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison}},
  author = {Ludovic Julien},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics Letters},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.4236/tel.2012.21013},
  url = {https://hal.science/hal-05758740v1},
  note = {CC BY},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison
AU  - Ludovic Julien
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/22
JO  - Theoretical Economics Letters
DO  - 10.4236/tel.2012.21013
UR  - https://hal.science/hal-05758740v1
AB  - In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers’ best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.
SN  - 2162-2086
SN  - 2162-2086
ER  -