SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains
Abstract
Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector α= A e(m) and each verifier holds a secret functional ci = ΓT λ(xi) derived from virtual anchors Γ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to ω verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most Q/q + 1/(q−1), a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for t < n/3, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size 32(ω+1) bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on n. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds.
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BibTeX
@misc{bagheri2026silmarilsmv,
title = {{SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains}},
author = {Khadijeh Bagheri and Hassan Khodaiemehr and Chen Feng},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.31814},
eprint = {2610.31814},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814},
note = {CC BY-NC-ND 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains
AU - Khadijeh Bagheri
AU - Hassan Khodaiemehr
AU - Chen Feng
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/22
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.31814
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814
AB - Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector α= A e(m) and each verifier holds a secret functional c_i = Γ^T λ(x_i) derived from virtual anchors Γ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to ω verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most Q/q + 1/(q−1), a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for t < n/3, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size 32(ω+1) bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on n. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds.
ER -