Composable Device-Independent Quantum Digital Signatures
Abstract
Extending device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography to composably support all fundamental information security objectives is crucial for secure quantum networks. Achieving this goal requires composable quantum digital signatures (QDSs), which support integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation when integrated into quantum networks. Yet existing QDS protocols generally rely on assumptions about the underlying quantum devices, while their security analyses remain largely restricted to stand-alone settings, leaving related-key attacks on the underlying linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based Toeplitz authentication unaddressed. Here, we establish the first composable security framework for QDS within constructive cryptography, and realize the corresponding ideal QDS resource by developing a DI-QDS protocol employing one-time universal hashing and multi-channel multiplexing. We further derive a related-key security bound for the underlying LFSR-based Toeplitz authentication, thereby establishing unforgeability while extending the forgery boundary considered in previous QDS security analyses. We also demonstrate the practical feasibility of our DI-QDS protocol under realistic quantum network conditions in the finite-size regime, with numerical simulations showing that it enables efficient signing of multibit documents over metropolitan-scale distances. Our results establish QDS as a composable cryptographic primitive and extend DI quantum cryptography to support the full range of information security objectives with composable security guarantees in future quantum networks.
Related
- Computing key rates for one-sided device-independent quantum key distribution
- Long-distance device-independent quantum key distribution using single-photon entanglement
- Reliable Entropy Estimation from Observed Statistics for Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography
- Local finite rate semi device independent randomness expansion from quantum contextuality
- Benchmarking Single-Photon Sources for Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
BibTeX
@misc{bian2026composable,
title = {{Composable Device-Independent Quantum Digital Signatures}},
author = {Jing-Wei Bian and Bing-Hong Li and Xu-Yang Lu and Shi-Gen Li and Hua-Lei Yin and Zeng-Bing Chen},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.39360},
eprint = {2610.39360},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39360},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Composable Device-Independent Quantum Digital Signatures
AU - Jing-Wei Bian
AU - Bing-Hong Li
AU - Xu-Yang Lu
AU - Shi-Gen Li
AU - Hua-Lei Yin
AU - Zeng-Bing Chen
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/29
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.39360
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39360
AB - Extending device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography to composably support all fundamental information security objectives is crucial for secure quantum networks. Achieving this goal requires composable quantum digital signatures (QDSs), which support integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation when integrated into quantum networks. Yet existing QDS protocols generally rely on assumptions about the underlying quantum devices, while their security analyses remain largely restricted to stand-alone settings, leaving related-key attacks on the underlying linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based Toeplitz authentication unaddressed. Here, we establish the first composable security framework for QDS within constructive cryptography, and realize the corresponding ideal QDS resource by developing a DI-QDS protocol employing one-time universal hashing and multi-channel multiplexing. We further derive a related-key security bound for the underlying LFSR-based Toeplitz authentication, thereby establishing unforgeability while extending the forgery boundary considered in previous QDS security analyses. We also demonstrate the practical feasibility of our DI-QDS protocol under realistic quantum network conditions in the finite-size regime, with numerical simulations showing that it enables efficient signing of multibit documents over metropolitan-scale distances. Our results establish QDS as a composable cryptographic primitive and extend DI quantum cryptography to support the full range of information security objectives with composable security guarantees in future quantum networks.
ER -