One Health preparedness for Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus: lessons from the 2026 outbreak centred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- 1School of Public Health, Nanjing Medical University, Nanjing, China.
- 2School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing, China.
- 3Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention & Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine, Beijing, China.
Abstract
The 2026 outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), involved limited international exportation but remained centred in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The outbreak tested whether earlier institutional mobilisation translated into timely field delivery. We conducted a structured narrative review of peer-reviewed research, official reports and operational guidance on epidemiology, diagnostics, medical countermeasures (MCMs), One Health surveillance, clinical care, infection prevention and control (IPC), community engagement and cross-border preparedness. Key institutional mechanisms for emergency decision-making, coordination and MCM prioritisation were activated earlier than during the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa, widening the window for action. Field delivery nevertheless remained uneven: the model-adjusted median onset-to-sampling delay was 4.8 days among 129 confirmed patients, while insecurity posed additional challenges for field response. Preparedness was further constrained by uncertainty about reservoir ecology, limited clinical validation of BDBV-specific diagnostics and the absence of MCMs with established efficacy in BVD. We therefore propose a One Health alert-to-action pathway linking human, animal, environmental and community signals to BDBV-inclusive confirmation, safe care, IPC, cross-border continuity, accountable governance and feedback-informed adaptation. Earlier activation is a preparedness gain, but protection depends on whether that advantage is carried through reliable, traceable and equitable operational hand-offs.
Related
- Notes from the Field: Outbreak of Ebola Disease Caused by Bundibugyo Virus — Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, May 2026
- National Ebola preparedness policy architecture and health system readiness in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda: a scoping review anchored in the 2026 Bundibugyo outbreak
- Temporal and Phylodynamic analyses of the 2026 Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Beyond viral species: the increasing mortality burden of the ongoing Bundibugyo ebolavirus outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Frontline-worker infections as a marker of infection-prevention stress during the 2026 Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
BibTeX
@article{shao2026health,
title = {{One Health preparedness for Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus: lessons from the 2026 outbreak centred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.}},
author = {Yuxuan Shao and Jue Liu and Lei Zhou},
journal = {Science in One Health},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.1016/j.soh.2026.100170},
url = {https://europepmc.org/article/MED/42927253},
note = {CC BY},
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
TI - One Health preparedness for Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus: lessons from the 2026 outbreak centred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
AU - Yuxuan Shao
AU - Jue Liu
AU - Lei Zhou
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/29
JO - Science in One Health
DO - 10.1016/j.soh.2026.100170
UR - https://europepmc.org/article/MED/42927253
AB - The 2026 outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), involved limited international exportation but remained centred in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The outbreak tested whether earlier institutional mobilisation translated into timely field delivery. We conducted a structured narrative review of peer-reviewed research, official reports and operational guidance on epidemiology, diagnostics, medical countermeasures (MCMs), One Health surveillance, clinical care, infection prevention and control (IPC), community engagement and cross-border preparedness. Key institutional mechanisms for emergency decision-making, coordination and MCM prioritisation were activated earlier than during the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa, widening the window for action. Field delivery nevertheless remained uneven: the model-adjusted median onset-to-sampling delay was 4.8 days among 129 confirmed patients, while insecurity posed additional challenges for field response. Preparedness was further constrained by uncertainty about reservoir ecology, limited clinical validation of BDBV-specific diagnostics and the absence of MCMs with established efficacy in BVD. We therefore propose a One Health alert-to-action pathway linking human, animal, environmental and community signals to BDBV-inclusive confirmation, safe care, IPC, cross-border continuity, accountable governance and feedback-informed adaptation. Earlier activation is a preparedness gain, but protection depends on whether that advantage is carried through reliable, traceable and equitable operational hand-offs.
SN - 2949-7043
ER -